From Thomas C. Schelling’s chapter "The Retarted Science of International Strategy" in The Strategy of Conflict:
As a matter of fact, many of the critical elements that go into a model of rational behavior can be identified with particular types of rationality and irrationality. The value system, the communication system, the information system, the collective decision process, the parameter representing the probability of error or loss of control, can be viewed as an effort to formalize the study of ‘irrationality.’ Hitler, the French Parliament, the commander of a bomber, the radar operators at Pearl Harbor, Khrushchev, and the American electorate may all suffer from some kinds of ‘irrationality,’ but by no means the same kind (Schelling 1980, 16-17).
Earlier in the same article, Schelling speaks "an understanding of 'correct' play" which can "give us a bench mark for the study of action behavior" (Ibid, 3). Schelling’s wisdom is in identifying the standard of rationality, not as a set of transcendent normative criteria, being embedded within the particular circumstances facing each agent. Such an approach is worth following since it pays attention to the particular situations in which behavior occurs, and doesn't fall into the conceit as to think that what it means to be rational can be easily elucidated in a journal article.
There is something to rational behavior which separates it from other behaviors. There are dimensions to decision making, like choosing what beliefs to to act upon or what motives to follow, which give reason for there to be a standard for fitting conduct like rationality. When talking about rationality, generally what we want to do is to discover a normative criteria and to figure out how actual behavior deviates from that criteria. Hitler, for instance, would certainly not have been rational if he decided to invade Russia if made that suggestion on the belief of the Wermacht's racial superiority, or if he had done so out of anger rather than a strategic calculus of whether the war was winnable.
Earlier in the same article, Schelling speaks "an understanding of 'correct' play" which can "give us a bench mark for the study of action behavior" (Ibid, 3). Schelling’s wisdom is in identifying the standard of rationality, not as a set of transcendent normative criteria, being embedded within the particular circumstances facing each agent. Such an approach is worth following since it pays attention to the particular situations in which behavior occurs, and doesn't fall into the conceit as to think that what it means to be rational can be easily elucidated in a journal article.
Etymology matters. In Cratylus, Plato’s argues that words are mortal gropings towards immortal meanings. In Essays on the First Formation of Language, Adam Smith’s arguesthat words are focal points for human conversation about the world, remembering the meanings of words is important for our comprehension of the ideas that are behind them. The word ‘rationality’ derives from the Latin word ‘ratio’ which, according to the ever reliable Wikitionary, is “1. A number representing a comparison between two things.” It cannot be described simply as ordinal preferences and transitivity, or as goal-orientated behavior; instead, rationality is a matter of focal standards which provided a bench mark for judging whether the behavior in question reached a standand which could be expected from it. When scholarship cannot make sense of ordinary language, it’s a sign that something has gone drastically wrong. Such is the case with rationality.
Collapsing rationality into little, or nothing, more than a description of all human action fails to live up to that conception that behavior can be judged according to standards and thereby judged rational or irrational. There are actually interesting questions intertwined with the word ‘rationality.’ In ordinary language, people use the word in ways that simply collapsing it to encompass all human behavior disappoints. There are such things that are used as focal standards for judging the rationality of human action. What those focal standards are is an interesting question which shines light upon the human condition, and which consequently shouldn't be defined out of existence.
Moreover, what those focal standards are all too often cannot be understood outside of a deep understanding of the context in which they occur. Speaking of the irrationality of Hitler or the French Parliament requires an understanding of the context they made their decisions within so that one can talk about the standards which Hitler or the French Parliament are to be judged by.
In the end, rationality is a matter of matching behavior with its focal standard, and what that focal standard is will depend on the situation each agent faces. There can be many ways in which different types of action and different types of plans can live up to rationality because they are judged by different focal standards. That something is rational within one circumstance and irrational is another is neither a contradiction, but rather a consequence of the fact that what it means to be rational depends on the factors at play within each circumstance.
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