Whatever you think of them, reform happens at the margins of politics.
Free trade has always been a tenet of libertarianism. After all, the unimpeded movement of goods across borders may be a paradigmatic example of the libertarian maxim of ‘Anything peaceful.’ It is then with trepidation that many libertarians have looked on at the debate surrounding free trade today. For them, the Trans-Pacific Partnership doesn’t look anything like free trade. Instead, it looks like just another arrangement between governments bestowing benefits upon their favored cronies at the expense of the rest of society. Yet, for whatever its controversy, if it is passed, the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be America’s largest trade agreement in effect and would thereby represent a marginal liberalization of trade across the region.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, then, is an example for a central irony to libertarianism: Although libertarianism advocates anything peaceful, it is often in need for politicians to advance its agenda. Very frequently the very act of de-governmentalization itself requires government. What a government erects can very often only be demolished by a government. Although, many new technologies have and will emerge that can disrupt regulations and thereby increase the overall liberty of society by creating a space that has yet to be interpreted with, such disruption isn’t always possible. In the case of trade, new technologies may make certain tariffs and quotas irrelevant to the lives of consumers, many more will remain and, in some way, harm consumers.
No Uber-like company will emerge that can allow American consumers to find a way around the United States’ protection of domestic sugar producers. Doing that would require government. However iron-clad the arguments for free trade may be, to actually get free trade requires a government eliminating its own obstructions, just as the peaceful enjoyment of alcohol required it to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment. Bargaining, interviews, negotiations and speeches are all necessary parts of the process. Without political acumen, trade reform would go nowhere. Free trade needs crafty politicians who are aware of when the political stars align and who can seize the initiative to advance liberty-enhancing reforms at the margins.
Libertarians worry about whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership would advance crony capitalism, not free markets. Cronies have certainly taken an interest in the treaty. That much is indisputable. As The Guardian reports, for ever ‘yea’ vote tallied in the Senate to give the White House fast-track authority, the US Business Coalition for TPP gave an average of $17,676.48 to it. That negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is being kept secret, contrary to standard operating protocol, only compounds those suspicions.
Although President Obama has said that there is nothing to worry about with the secret negotiations, certainly the president is not unaware of how ironic it is for him to assert that while still keeping the supposedly innocuous records out of the public eye. The old quip, quis custodiet ipsos custodes, looms large. Combined with the amount of money that businesses have spent, the secrecy surrounding the Trans-Pacific Partnership is bound to pique the suspicion of many libertarians. Those opponents of the Trans-Pacific Partnership are, then, right enough since there certainly is plenty of crony capitalism in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Nevertheless, a sober assessment of the treaty and particularly its impact at the political margins of liberty should inform us that these are acceptable costs to a policy that will lead to an improvement of the overall liberty of all involved. It’s true that the Trans-Pacific Partnership wouldn’t lead to a system of perfectly free trade and, in doing so, would plenty of room for each nation’s particular cronies to prosper. But we don’t live in a world where such a system of perfectly free trade is attainable. We live in a world where the treaty is on;y an improvement at the margins and where those improvements are going to have to be made in a way that placates each nation’s many cronies. The Trans-Pacific Partnership promises just that: marginally freer trade, with all the benefits that marginally freer trade would have. The Brookings Institute estimates that the global gains that marginally freer trade would be in the vicinity of at around $295 billion each year.
By being self-aware that any liberalization of trade would require government action, libertarians can be very open about the costs of the treaty while at the same time confident that it will have a beneficial overall effect. To remove the barriers to trade that exist across the Pacific requires an act of government. That alone would introduce some cronyism to the reform. Worse, it requires an act of many governments, all with their own particular faults. Nevertheless, that any progress towards liberalization in trade is possible is itself a miracle. A miracle that is only possible because of crafty politicians in government today. It’s not everyday that their actions would have a liberty-enhancing outcome and so the opportunity shouldn’t be squandered by comparing our imperfect world to a libertarian utopia.
Overall, the Trans-Pacific Partnership reveals an irony in any hope of libertarian reform today: However much libertarians may properly distrust politicians, free-trade reform will only happen if the politicians in power are able to negotiate the restraints away. On this issue, the cause of liberty, therefore, is in the precarious and inextricable position of relying on government to remove government. Maybe they shouldn’t stop worrying, but libertarians should start to give the Trans-Pacific Partnership the modest love it deserves.
Some Remarks About Constitutional Conservatives...
If there is one benefit that the Trump Administration has brought to the United States, it has been the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to fill the late Antonin Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court. For better and for worse, Mr. Gorsuch’s nomination has provided the opportunity for commentators to discuss the late Supreme-Court justice’s judicial philosophy of originalism. Over at Vox, Sean Illing has argued that Scalia’s originalism was less a purely judicial philosophy and more a wider political ideology:
Mr. Illing goes on to quote Barack Obama’s Audacity of Hope’s discussion of this aspect of legal philosophy:
I must admit that I find it difficult to charitably reproduce the argument that, because there was disagreement when a law was written, that something was agreed to when the ink was put to paper, that the written law therefore does not contain some resolution or synthesis of that disagreement.
As a Catholic, I am reminded here of canon law. Canon law is the internal ecclesiastical law that governs the Roman Catholic Church, derived from Roman law, and it is the longest continually legal system in all of Western civilization. Canon law states (749§2) that: “The college of bishops also possesses infallibility in teaching when the bishops gathered together in an ecumenical council exercise the magisterium as teachers and judges of faith and morals who declare for the universal Church that a doctrine of faith or morals is to be held definitively…” However, anybody who has a bit of knowledge about the Catholic Church knows that ecumenical councils, although they promulgated written dogma, scarcely ever settled conflict in the generation in which those debates raged. One need only examine how long, say, the Arian controversy lasted after the Council of Nicaea lasted to see that written dogmas frequently failed to content partisans at odds with those controversies.
However, no canon lawyer would argue that, because there was disagreement about the Arian controversy after the Council of Nicaea, that the Nicaean creed is a “living creed” that may be adapted to the arbitrary opinions of subsequent bishops. Instead, the Nicaean creed said something. Even if contemporary Arians might not have been persuaded, it was the responsibility of future canon lawyers and theologians to exactly figure out the meaning of those words and enforce them. Fast forwarding to the 20th century, for this reason, the Second Vatican Council won’t be fully appreciated until long after the death of its partisans so that canon-law jurists may impartially read and interpret the documents that Vatican II produced without having to worry about the debates that generated those documents (and which those documents resolve) still being a matter of living memory.
When one takes a historical view of legal systems, that people disagree with what a law says within the generation in which that law was put to ink is to be expected. That disagreement certainly does not imply that the written law has no meaning, it only means that jurists of subsequent generations need to be cautious about how they interpret that law. Partisans may disagree about what words say, but that does not absolve jurists of their duty to pin down what the written words of law mean and imply. Ultimately, I don’t think that disagreement does not give warrant to the introduction of a jurists’ arbitrary views into those words.
In another article at Vox, Ezra Klein has argued that Mr. Gorsuch is “is an extremely conservative judge at a moment when an extremely conservative judge makes a mockery of the popular will.” However, the popular will is not an element of law and should have no place in a jurists’ reading of the law. Popular will has other places to express itself in the political system, from voluntary associations to the election of Congress. Indeed, that the House of Representatives, which is probably that portion of the federal government that best reflects the popular will of the American people, is overwhelmingly Republican is evidence that the popular will desire a Supreme-Court nominee who, in Mr. Klein reckoning, is “extremely conservative”! Of course, we needn’t forget that Mr. Klein had written, back in October, that “Hillary Clinton crushed Donald Trump in the most effective series of debate performances in modern political history.” So maybe Mr. Klein should be taking a hiatus about talking about the popular will of the American people during the Trump Administration.
As far as I can see, constitutional conservatives might be the closest things to true liberals in American politics today and best vehicle for advancing the general welfare. They understand the rule of law and the primacy of the abstract. They are well-read in the intellectual fonts that influenced the American Founders, including John Locke, Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke, and whose wisdom still provides the intellectual foundation for any free society today. I have once been skeptically of many of their views on the powers of the presidency, which at time seem quasi-monarchical, but I have since been convinced by Eric Nelson’s book, The Royalist Revolution, that those views are in-line with the Founders’ ideas for the executive branch.
Those intellectual fonts, as well as the American Founders, had a confidence that, once broken free from monarchical privilege, that the wisdom of common people could secure the felicity of their society. However, they also understood that liberty cannot exist outside of the rule of law. Thankfully, breaking free of monarchical privilege does not imply the breaking of the rule of law, and constitutional conservatives are aware of that. In a world where only the dose makes the poison, constitutional conservatives have a proper skepticism of experts granted privilege that has turned into an excessive populism in the Western world today.
Posted by Harrison Searles on 03/22/2017 at 05:28 PM in Commentary, Conservatism, Current Affairs, Law, Liberalism | Permalink | Comments (0)
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