In his first set of lecture notes on what I gather is a series of lectures about the Great Recession, Paul Krugman cites John Maynard Keynes’ “The Great Slump” as follows:
This is a nightmare, which will pass away with the morning. For the resources of nature and men's devices are just as fertile and productive as they were. The rate of our progress towards solving the material problems of life is not less rapid. We are as capable as before of affording for everyone a high standard of life—high, I mean, compared with, say, twenty years ago— and will soon learn to afford a standard higher still. We were not previously deceived. But today we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is that our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time—perhaps for a long time.
The technocratic point of view is that wealth is simply an artifice, it’s simply a matter of solving the problem in front of us. To paraphrase someone I read on Facebook the other day, inventing the iPhone is a matter of taking research and adding water. From the technocratic point of view, the slump is our fault and every day that it goes on, it is a failure of human ratiocination. If we had not blundered in our control of the delicate machine that is the economy, the slump could have been avoided. In sum, slumps are our fault, which is why Paul Krugman wrote a book two years ago titled, End This Depression Now!.
I agree with Mr. Krugman that “what is going on in a depressed economy? How is it that “our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a Time?” is a key issue for understanding the wealth of nations in the context of slumps. Yet, I think that he errs in asserting that the question “what leads to the crises that precede a depressed economy?” distracts us from considering the first question. The answer to neither is obvious. The reason we cannot end slumps with the ease of pushing a button is that we lack the dispersed bits of knowledge about the causes of the slump and the long-run results it heads towards.
After all, the slump isn’t an event all its own; rather, it’s a continuation of events that had happened before and are, themselves, heading towards their long-run consequences. To therefore understand the first question Mr. Krugman offers, we have understand the second question. There is no such thing as ‘depression’ or ‘slump’ economics, only economic processes continuing themselves.
The wealth of nations is a manifestation of a lengthy history of market selection. Entrepreneurs do create order, but whether that order is wealth, that is whether it serves the human race’s most urgent appetites, can only be determined by the markets. Although entrepreneurs make bold conjectures about what can add to a nation’s wealth, those conjectures are, nevertheless, fallible. Whether they will prove right, or at least advantageous, is a matter of the market process, and entrepreneurs are exposed to both the possibilities of success and failure, profit or loss. The fragility of an individual entrepreneur’s situation adds to the greater health of the market. The markets are thereby antifragile. They love volatility. Slumps should be understood as being part of that volatility—the rest of this post will largely be me punning the table on that point.
Here, the feedback mechanism between entrepreneur’s conjectures and the market process is critical. As Eric Beinhocker argues in The Origin of Wealth, wealth is fit order The market process is what tests the fitness of the variety of orders created by entrepreneurs. Here, we’ve got the three conditions for evolution: a population of various entities, a means of those entities surviving through time, and the non-random selection of entities better suited to their environment.
Figuring out what actually adds to the wealth of the United States, or France, or Japan, or the world for that matter, takes time. There is a knowledge problem that needs to be conquered in figuring out what is wealth and that problem can only be solved by the joint efforts of producers and consumers all trying to appease their own particular appetites. Those interactions nonlinearly add up to constitute the market process. No one knows what actually adds to the wealth of nations, so therefore everyone has got to wait for the final market test, determined by the market process. Will the iPhone profit? Will house prices continue to go down. Will this or that commodity be the future? Creating wealth simply isn’t a matter of taking scientific knowledge and adding water, it’s a matter of being alert to new possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange.
As Arnold Kling writes in “Wither Macroeconomics?,” we have to take very seriously the idea that slumps are a product of the breaking down of the capitalist system. While such a choice of words may sound downright Marxist, it is an apt description of what happens when the patterns of specialization and trade that once constituted an economy break down. The economic ways of life that people once relied on go underwater without an immediate replacement available. All that is solid seems to dissolve to air and people, having to look for new specializations to fit into the greater economic ecosystem they are embedded in, begin to doubt the future. Going ever more Medieval, we can talk about the forces that corrupted those patterns, say policies that aggressively encouraged homeownership and mortgage lending, and still be talking more sense than attempts to explain all slumps in AS/AD fashion.
The technocratic point of view would lead us to believe that the problem of slumps is a matter of technological knowledge that requires a conscious decision to jump-start the economy, whether by fiscal or monetary stimulus. In “The Great Slump,” Keynes declared that “We have magneto trouble.” Earlier in the same article, he had declared, in the quote above, “to-day we have involved in control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand.” Keynes is right that we do not understand the working of the economy, but he errs in calling it a machine. The economy is an ecosystem of production and exchange, not a machine. Injecting a little bit of stimulus here or there won’t have a linear impact, but will create a cascade of changes we can scarcely know. In the long run, we may be dead, bit the effects of our policies will live on in unpredictable fashions.
Generally, slumps are a symptom of a greater knowledge problem and thereby need to be understood as millions of people all trying to jointly solve it. Slumps are an occasion for celebrating entrepreneurs, not policy makers. Getting out of the lump not about a jump starting an engine as it is discovering new opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. The problem is, therefore, less a matter of a stuttering engine as it is a matter of evolutionary search. The decisions to be made by millions of entrepreneurs, not hundreds of technocrats.
Slumps are a part of the evolution of wealth. Anyone who denies that is selling snake oil. The technocrats who promise otherwise are of the most dangerous animals in the political menagerie.