
“Do not think that I have
come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a
sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a
daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her
mother-in-law; and a man's foes will be those of his own household.
He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and
he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and he
who does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me.”
-Matthew
10:34-38 (Revised Standard Edition)
Doxastic
(from the Greek word δόξα
-“Doxa” - meaning “belief”) commitment, a steadfast
allegiance in action to the beliefs one holds, is an intrinsic
precondition of honor. After all, one of the fundamental demands of
honor is the condition of skin in the game, that the person in
question be exposed to the costs of her actions. When an honorable
human beings acts, she does so in a fashion that exposes her to not
only the benefits, but also all of the costs, no matter how bitter,
of that action.
The
honorable person is thus fully exposed to all of the harmful
consequences that result from her behavior. Just as she has her skin
in the game when it comes to her ventures in the world exposing her
to the harmful effects of those ventures going belly up, she has her
soul in the game when it comes to her moral beliefs exposing her to
being hurt by them. Nevertheless, doxastic commitment demands that we
put our full soul into the game, and be willing to take whatever hurt
that follows.
No
one likes being hurt, and no one especially likes consciously opening
himself to harm in the future. Soul in the game exposes the very
fiber of our ethical being and identities to wounds, uncertain in
their severity, so it should be no surprise that so many want to
avoid identifying themselves with clear-cut moral propositions that
doxastic commitment requires. As Cicero noted in On Duties:
“From the beginning nature has assigned to every type of creature
the tendency to preserve itself, its life and body, and to reject
anything that seems likely to harm them...” Our animal nature thus
expresses itself when we hedge on our believes and remove our whole
soul from the game in order to avoid pain.
However,
if doxastic commitment leads to a great chance of being hurt in the
future, then would it not be rational to protect oneself against that
pain by hedging one's beliefs? We need not abandon all of our moral
commitment to do this; rather, we only need to be a bit wishy-washy
on key matters that would bring up conflict. Our soul need not
completely out of the game, but it could just play the game less
intensely. However, this ignores the twofold importance of doxastic
commitment. Not only is it a laudable trait for a human being to
have, but doxastic commitment is conducive to the selection of the
best moral practices across societies.
For
one thing, fear of pain is never a virtuous motivation. It may
illicit sympathy from an onlooker, but the impartial spectator would
never applaud it. There is simply no honor in it. That being willing
to accept great costs for one's beliefs is so important to honor is
displayed in dueling traditions in history. Those customs demanded
that a duelist be willing to sustain great bodily harm, and even
death, to display their doxastic commitment and therefore their
honor.
Another
aspect of doxastic commitment is that it is much easier to keep
people accountable for their beliefs in a community that adheres to
that custom. Doxastic commitment thus allows for the efficient
communication of desired moral conduct because a person with her full
soul in the game is open to social cues that alert her to the
desirability of her conduct. Why this is so can be understood in
light of systems theory. In a complicated system in which paths of
concatenation twist and turn this way and that, simple signals that
illicit certain responses from the constituent parts of the system
are a means of ensuring that the constituent parts of that system are
operating as they need to ensure the health of that system. Thirst
and hunger are two mundane examples by which an animal body, itself a
system of many constituent parts, ensures that it is kept well fed
and satiated. An animal need not take measurements of either
hydration or nourishment to maintain its health; instead signals
within the system provide controls that keep it acting towards the
overall wellbeing of the whole system.
A
moral community is also a complex, adaptive system since there is a
constantly changing frequency of moral habits within it, and those
frequencies can change based on the signals of approbation and
censure they interact with. In order for the best patterns of conduct
to multiply within the community, people need to learn what those
best patterns of conduct are, and be put into a situation in which
they are likely to actually go through with adopting them. Both are
critically necessary. In order to discover them, people need to have
their moral character open to critique. So much in human knowledge
proceeds via the process of conjecture and refutation. This is
especially true when all of the knowledge necessary to come to the
final judgment is rarely at the disposal of any one person, which is
certainly true in practical ethics. We may never have the knowledge
to determine the judgment of the impartial spectator, but he social
process of conjecture and refutation, of approbation and censure, can
help us come close.
However, moral learning by approbation and censure can only function
when there's soul in the game. When people do not put their whole
soul in the game, they weaken the signals that they receive about the
desirability and propriety of how they live their lives. When people
choose to associate themselves with moral propositions that are so
indefinite that they can be twisted to suit almost any situation
imaginable, then they are unaccountable. Any attempt to criticize
them is like trying to grip water: It will always frustratingly slip
between one's fingers, ever in metamorphosis to accommodate the
circumstances.
Worse, people are more likely to put their whole soul in the game
when they are likely to receive praise than when they are to receive
condemnation. So now not only is not holding to the habit of having
soul in the game not only because it delays the process of the
discovery of the best morals by conjecture and refutation, but it
also corrupts that process because people will act so as to get a
positive signal without truly having the trait that would bring that
positive signal about. Not only do they not have their whole soul in
the game, but the soul they put there is not their own.
As a
result, doxastic commitment lends itself not only to personal virtue,
but also the efficient operation of an ethical society in which
everyone gets not only the benefits, but also the costs, of their
moral beliefs, which in turn helps to weed out the least proper and
least cleaved-to moral beliefs.
Doxastic
commitment is thus not only a sine qua non for a human being's
virtue, but also a rule that helps the efficient discovery of the
best moral beliefs. Without soul-in-the-game, not only is an
individual really incapable of standing for anything because he is
incapable of being wrong on anything, but an individual is not
accountable for what they have said before because they have not
committed to it. A human being without soul-in-the-game is either
too afraid of the pain that being open to the costs of one's beliefs
or simply does not have any. The impartial spectator would certainly
applaud neither.